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a b s t r a c t
Waterborne diseases, often arising from freshwater pollution, are a leading cause of mortality
in developing countries. However, data limitations inhibit our understanding of the extent of
damage arising from freshwater pollution. We employ a novel hydrological approach com-
bined with village census data to study the effect of upstream polluting behavior on down-
stream health in Indonesia. We ﬁnd that upstream use of rivers for bathing and associated
sanitary practices can explain as many as 7.5% of all diarrhea-related deaths annually. We
also ﬁnd suggestive evidence for differential avoidance behavior in response to different pol-
lutants. Our approach relies on publicly available satellite data, open source hydrologicalmod-
els, and coarse village census data allowing us to estimate health externalities from river pol-
lution in particularly vulnerable and data poor environments.
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Waterborne diseases are one of the leading causes ofmortality in developing countries (Duﬂo et al., 2015; Gamper-Rabindran
et al., 2010; Kremer et al., 2011; Do et al., 2018). These diseases, such as Acute Diarrheal Infections, are devastating because
young children in rural areas tend to be the most vulnerable. Access to healthcare among these populations is limited, which is
compounded by the absence of formal sanitation facilities and widespread freshwater pollution in rural impoverished areas. In
such a context, the social cost of freshwater pollution remains poorly understood, especially at a large national scale.
In this paper, we consider the case of river pollution and resulting waterborne diseases in Indonesia focussing on diarrhea,
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which globally accounts for more than 1.5 million deaths each year (WHO, 2014). Freshwater pollution is an important con-
sideration in low- and middle-income countries where untreated river water is routinely consumed, in part due to the lack of
access to alternative sources of water and low enforcement of policies intended to prevent contamination.1 Earlier work in the
area of freshwater pollution has focused primarily on industrial waste disposal in rivers (Ebenstein, 2012; Cai et al., 2016; Chen
et al., 2016). We emphasize the role of household river pollution, particularly in-river bathing and associated sanitary practices,
and ﬁnd that upstream river-based sanitary practices in Indonesia can explain as many as 7.5 percent of all diarrheal deaths
in a given year, which over our four year sample translates to 860 diarrheal fatalities. We ﬁnd suggestive evidence that house-
holds engage in avoidance behavior in response to upstream use of rivers for trash disposal but not to upstream use of rivers for
bathing and sanitary practices.
There are two main barriers that researchers face to estimating the effects of freshwater pollution on human populations in
poor countries. First, for a number of reasons, data on fresh water pollution levels is incorrect, incomplete or entirely missing
especially in locations where this problem is most pressing (Excell and Moses, 2017). In many cases, maps of existing river
networks, especially minor rivers that are more likely to be used for water consumption, are unavailable. Second, even when
such data are available, ﬁnding a relevant instrument or natural experiment to generate plausibly exogenous variation in fresh
water pollution remains challenging.
We overcome previously identiﬁed data constraints in the area of fresh water pollution in two ways (Currie et al., 2014).
First, to identify missing river networks we use publicly-available remote-sensed data on river basins and high-resolution dig-
ital elevation models to trace out river pathways. We subsequently “ground-truth” these through village census data that pro-
vide information on a village’s on-river status. Second, absent comprehensive data on water pollution levels in Indonesia, we
use information on polluting behavior of upstream villages as a proxy for downstream pollution levels. This is a reasonable
assumption given the natural ﬂow of water, sediment and pollutants downstream. Our approach has the advantage of being
generalizable to other settings in low-income countries where on-the-ground pollution monitoring is rare but remotely-sensed
data and satellite imagery are publicly available.
We address the identiﬁcation challenge of ﬁnding meaningfully large variation in river pollution that is exogenous to local
health outcomes in three ways.2 First, we use our novel dataset of drainage basins in Indonesia to assign to each of the villages
in our sample their respective set of upstream and downstream villages from approximately 5.8 billion possible upstream-
downstream hydrological linkages. As a starting point, we rely on the identifying assumption that within-province (the admin-
istration of water pollution regulation is at the provincial level) year-to-year changes in upstream polluting behavior are exoge-
nous to downstream health outcomes. This assumption is plausible because household level in-river polluting behavior in
Indonesia is de facto unregulated, minimizing the selection across villages under the same regulatory jurisdiction. Moreover,
we use data on upstream polluting behavior rather than data on local pollution levels. As a result, we are not relying on cor-
relating local pollution with local health outcomes, which could be spurious for many reasons including but not limited to
geographic sorting. Instead, we rely on variation in upstream polluting behavior that, in a defacto unregulated environment
is plausibly exogenous to downstream health outcomes. As such, our strategy can be employed in other contexts when it is
important to understand downstream externalities and the path of the pollutant determines the marginal social cost of pollu-
tion.
Second, we test the validity of our identifying assumption and rule out geographic sorting through a battery of falsiﬁcation
tests and ﬁnd that for a given village, bathing and associated sanitary practices by upstream villages increases diarrheal inci-
dence, while similar polluting behavior by downstream villages has no effect. Furthermore, we show that the effect is speciﬁc to
diarrhea (consistent with its waterborne nature), with no measurable effect on other non-waterborne diseases. The absence of
an effect on other diseases is inconsistent with the existence of a spurious correlation between upstream polluting and down-
stream health due to, for example, wealth or income, as one would expect to see such a correlation manifest as a signiﬁcant
impact between upstream bathing and at least one of the other diseases as well.3
Third, we address the potential of upstream river bathing and associated sanitary practices serving as a proxy for ease of river
access, and show that there are no meaningful negative health impacts for other upstream river uses, such as transportation
and agriculture. Importantly, while alternative explanations could exist for each of our results, it is unlikely that a plausible
alternative explanation would rationalize all of our empirical ﬁndings.
We contribute to the growing intersection of environmental and development economics. Speciﬁcally, we build on the lit-
erature emphasizing the estimation of causal impacts of environmental quality on human health, particularly in developing
1 Greenstone and Hanna (2014) ﬁnd that while air pollution regulations had a measurable impact on infant mortality in India, water pollution laws had no
measurable effect.
2 While researchers have previously employed randomized designs in subsidies for provision of clean water (Ahuja et al., 2010; Kremer et al., 2011; Guiteras
et al., 2016), to the best of our knowledge no one has used experimental or quasi-experimental variation to study the impact of household river pollution on local
health outcomes at a national scale. The closest study to our work is Ebenstein (2012) who uses rainfall as an instrument for water quality (and not polluting
behavior or biological pollutant concentrations) at certain sites in China to study the impact of poor water quality on digestive cancers. More recently, Lipscomb
and Mobarak (2017) have examined the political economy of water pollution in Brazil, and Kahn et al. (2015) have done so in China.
3 The remaining threat to identiﬁcation would be if individuals sorted geographically across upstream and downstream villages within a province in our time
frame and in response to time-varying omitted variables that were correlated with upstream polluting behavior and diarrheal outbreaks, but not upstream
polluting behavior and outbreaks of malaria, measles, respiratory infections or dengue. Given that in Indonesia, downstream (coastal) villages tend to be eco-
nomically better off than upstream villages, this seems very unlikely.
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countries (see Graff Zivin and Neidell (2013) for an exhaustive review).4 Our contribution is a novel method to generate data on
pollution exposure in data-scarce contexts, and subsequently employs an identiﬁcation strategy relying on successfully being
able to match upstream and downstream pairs of villages. We also extend the literature on avoidance, which, in developing
countries has focused primarily on governance (Galiani et al., 2005) and accessibility (Jalan and Ravallion, 2003; Ahuja et al.,
2010) of clean water provision. While avoidance strategies such as relocation (Currie et al., 2013) and the purchasing of clean
bottled water (Graff Zivin et al., 2011) have been documented in the United States, less evidence exists in rural areas. We doc-
ument differential avoidance behavior across pollutants; households along trash-polluted rivers seek out alternative drinking
water sources relative to those downstream of river bathers.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1 we provide an overview of water pollution regulation in Indonesia
and the epidemiological evidence on the link between river bathing (and associated hygienic practices) and diarrhea. In section
2 we describe the health and demographic data used in this paper, as well as the construction of the upstream-downstream
village networks. Section 3 details the econometric strategy that we use and in section 4 we discuss the empirical results. We
provide robustness checks, as well as extensions of these results in section 5. Section 6 offers our concluding notes.
1. Background and institutional context
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the state of water pollution and associated regulations in Indonesia to demon-
strate that river pollution, particularly originating from households, is de facto unregulated. We also review the evidence on the
epidemiological foundations of the impact of river bathing and sanitary practices on water quality.
1.1. Water pollution regulation in Indonesia
Indonesia has made recent advances in environmental regulation, including the 2009 Environmental Protection andManage-
ment Law that recognizes the “serious problem” of decreasing environmental quality, as well as executive actions designed to
reduce emissions and other forms of pollution (Nachmany et al., 2014). Yet, the regulation of water pollution in Indonesia can be
characterized as nominally mandated but not regulated for some industries, and fully non-existent for others, especially in the
period covered by our study (2000–2008). Ostensibly, any individual or business that purposely pollutes or otherwise damages
water sources can face imprisonment for up to 9 years and a maximum ﬁne of 1.5 billion rupiah (USD 105,000), in accordance
with Article 94 of Indonesia’s Law No. 7/2004 concerning water resources. The provincial governments are responsible for the
regulation and supervision of all water resources, including rivers, that fall within their jurisdictions. Despite the steep penal-
ties for polluters, the quality of Indonesia’s water sources remains low. Several studies including those by the Ministry of the
Environment (MoE) found that all 35 rivers that were tested across Indonesia were unsafe sources for drinking water (AECEN,
2008).6
The most unregulated source of water pollution in Indonesia is household and municipal discarding of sewage. Households
routinely dispose of waste directly into rivers, while the improper construction of municipal wastewater facilities leads to the
disposal of untreated sewage into river waters (Kerstens et al., 2013). For example, nearly two-thirds of the Citarum River’s
biological oxygen demand (BOD) comes from household pollution, as compared to one-third from all industrial and agricultural
activities combined (Kerstens et al., 2013). Regulation of water pollution at the household level is non-existent, with households
polluting into lakes and rivers with de facto impunity.
Water pollution in Indonesia is also generated from industrial waste and agricultural run-off (GWP, 2013). Industrial pollut-
ing causes toxic materials such as heavy metals and mercury to enter and poison drinking water sources. The 1989 Clean Water
Program (CWP), a government initiative to curb water pollution, achieved spotty reductions in industrial pollutants with dispro-
portionate success in East Java (Lucas and Djati, 2000). The mixed success of the CWP may be attributable to its enforceability,
as the program was designed to be voluntary (Bedner, 2010) and water pollution regulations across Indonesia generally do not
apply to small ﬁrms and home industries (Braadbaart, 1995).7
1.2. Use of rivers for bathing and sanitation
The use of rivers for bathing and sanitation purposes poses twomajor risks to human health, both of which are symptomatic
of diarrhea. First, river bathing increases the amount of free carbon dioxide (CO2) and decreases the amount of dissolved oxy-
gen (DO) in rivers (Bhatnagar and Sangwan, 2009; Sharma et al., 2012). Organic and biodegradable waste from the bathers is
decomposed by microbes that use oxygen and release carbon dioxide back into river water. This effect is ampliﬁed by the use
4 Our work is positioned in the area water pollution (Carson et al., 2011; Ebenstein, 2012) with speciﬁc focus on a cause of diarrheal diseases (Dasgupta, 2004)
in a country with a documented history of under-regulated and poor quality drinking water (Resosudarmo, 2003).
5 We remain agnostic as to the reason behind differential avoidance behavior as it is beyond the scope of the exercise in this paper.
6 In fact, the Citraum River has been found to be one of the most polluted places on Earth (Bernhardt and Gysi, 2013).
7 This is true for small scale industrial enterprises, aswell as small and family-run farms,which account for nearly a ﬁfth of national GDP. In general, agriculture
has been relatively less regulated than industrial activity. For example, the Clean Water Program only applies to industrial ﬁrms and no counterpart has been
created for the agricultural sector.
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of soaps and detergents that are absorbed by aquatic ﬂora. Higher CO2 levels drive phosphate and alkalinity concentrations,
which lead to river eutrophication. Consumption of water from eutrophic rivers has been linked to gastroenteritis (WHO, 2002)
and cyanobacterial toxins (Scott et al., 1985; Wu, 1999), both of which can cause symptoms of intestinal pain, nausea, and
diarrhea.
Second, river use for bathing and sanitation can lead to an increased presence of coliform bacteria, which are associatedwith
harmful pathogens known to cause nausea, vomiting, and bloody diarrhea, especially among infants and those with compro-
mised immune systems (Joshi and Sati, 2011; Tyagi et al., 2013). While fecal coliforms do not necessarily cause diarrhea, their
presence is correlated with diarrhea pathogens that may arise from removing trace amounts of fecal matter from the body dur-
ing bathing. This is especially true for the cleaning of infants directly in the river after defecation, which greatly increases the
amount of fecal matter present in the water.
2. Data
In this section, we describe the health and demographic data, the geospatial methods used to conduct the upstream and
downstream assignment of villages along Indonesia’s hydrological network, and the classiﬁcation of each village into an identi-
ﬁable drainage basin.
2.1. Health and demographic data
The Indonesian statistical agency, Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS), conducts a biennial census of all Indonesian villages known as
Podes. Our sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 32,107 villages over four years (2000, 2003, 2006 and 2008) spread across
all major Indonesian islands with the exception of Java.8,9 The census is conducted in a short span of 4–6 weeks in October
and November and consists of an exhaustive questionnaire to which village heads respond.10 The census contains village-level
information on health, population, river location and other demographic variables.
2.2. Disease data
The Podesprovides themost exhaustive dataset on outbreaks and resulting deaths fromﬁvemajor diseases: dengue, diarrhea,
malaria, measles and respiratory infections. Podes data is collected every 2–3 years in over 66,000 Indonesian villages. In each
year of the census, the village head is asked to report if there was an outbreak of each of the different infections in that year.
However, the village head is not provided any instructions - such as a cut-off or a point of comparison with respect to deaths or
infections - in determiningwhether an outbreak has taken place. If the village-heads deems there is an outbreak, he/she provides
an estimate of the total number of diarrhea-related fatalities. As such it is feasible that there were disease-driven deaths in a
given year that were unreported in Podes because the degree of spread was not determined “high” enough to be considered
an outbreak. As a result in section A.1, we demonstrate that any such bunching occurs around the critical threshold of zero,
allowing us to minimize such concerns.
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the probability of village-level outbreaks for different diseases. Diarrhea, following
only malaria, is the second most prevalent disease in Indonesia, followed closely by respiratory infections. Diarrhea is slightly
more prevalent in hilly areas relative to ﬂatter ones, and in rural areas relative to urban settings. A spatial mapping of diarrheal
outbreaks across the Indonesian villages in our sample is presented in Fig. 1. This geographic pattern of disease prevalence is
consistent across all diseases with the exception of dengue, which is endemic to urban areas. The differences between these
groups are statistically signiﬁcant but not meaningfully large (columns 2 and 3).
2.3. Population and demographic data
Our primary variable of interest is information on river bathing practices of villages in Indonesia. Importantly, river bathing is
associated with river use for other sanitary activities, such as defecation (Hutton et al., 2008; Wasonga et al., 2014). Households
that use the river for bathing also typically lack proper sanitation facilities, and use the river as an open sewerage system through
the use of “hanging latrines” that deposit fecal matter directly into the river. Individuals - especially infants and young children
- may defecate while bathing as well, which would contribute to an increase in the overall level of dangerous water-borne
pathogens.
8 We have 25,894 villages in 2000, 22,952 villages in 2003, 28,041 villages in 2006 and 32,107 villages in 2008. We construct our key independent variable -
upstream bathing - separately for each year, reducing concerns over an unbalanced panel. In section 4 we show that our results are robust when we consider
only a balanced panel.
9 Java, where the capital city of Jakarta is located, is the most densely populated island with an unusually high level of urbanization relative to the other
islands. Additionally, Java has differential level of enforcement of water pollution that we do not have the data to capture. We leave it as a future follow-up
exercise, and in this paper we focus on the other major Indonesian islands.
10 We are aware that some components of this information are veriﬁed at the sub-district or district oﬃces but we do not have information of the precise
sections of the survey that are veriﬁed.
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Table 1
Probability of village-level disease outbreaks.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Flat Villages Hilly Urban Rural
Was there an outbreak of diarrhea 0.183
(0.387)
0.158
(0.365)
0.188
(0.391)
0.158
(0.365)
0.185
(0.389)
Was there an outbreak of respiratory 0.111
(0.315)
0.0978
(0.297)
0.118
(0.323)
0.101
(0.301)
0.112
(0.316)
Was there an outbreak of measles 0.0807
(0.272)
0.0748
(0.263)
0.0866
(0.281)
0.0682
(0.252)
0.0820
(0.274)
Was there an outbreak of malaria 0.207
(0.405)
0.165
(0.371)
0.231
(0.421)
0.127
(0.333)
0.216
(0.411)
Was there an outbreak of dengue 0.0613
(0.240)
0.0698
(0.255)
0.0420
(0.201)
0.213
(0.409)
0.0454
(0.208)
Observations 108,991 54,122 23,124 10,298 98,693
The table reports the proportion of villages (with standard deviations in parenthesis) in a given year reporting the incidence of
diarrhea (row 1), respiratory diseases (row 2), measles (row 3), malaria (row 4) and dengue (row 5) in the full sample (column
1). We break down the full sample into ﬂat villages (column 2) and hilly villages (column 3) as well as urban (column 4) and
rural villages (column 5).
Fig. 1. Percentage of villages declaring a diarrheal outbreak in a year.
Podes reports the dominant location of bathing activity (e.g. in-river, other) for each village. This is a binary variable and Podes
does not contain information on the number of individuals engaging in bathing. As an alternative, we use village populations
to construct our key explanatory variables: the number of individuals polluting in the river through in-river bathing. To create
this variable, we replicate the following exercise on river bathing for both upstream and downstream aggregate measures. For
a given year t, village v, with nvt villages upstream along the river that passes through village v, we deﬁne our key independent
variable - the number of individuals engaging in upstream river bathing as,
Upstreamvt =
∑
nvt
[
populationnt ∗ bathingnt
]
(1)
where populationnt is the population of the n
th
t
upstream village and bathingnt is a binary variable, which is equal to 1 if the
majority of households in the village bathe in the river in year t, and 0 otherwise. We repeat this exercise for all downstream
villages.
There are two important considerations when using the above measure as our key independent variable. First, it is likely
that in-river bathing is associated with other sanitary practices that result in increased concentrations of fecal contaminants in
the river. Unfortunately, Podes does not directly ask about the nature and location of village defecating behavior.11 However, it
is likely the villages that use the river as a primary bathing source use it for sanitation purposes as well. Thus, we cautiously
interpret our bathing variable as a proxy for the total of all associated sanitation practices that take place in the river.
11 Podes does contain variables that ask about the presence of public and private latrines, but it does not specify the type of latrine (e.g. hanging latrine vs pit
latrine) nor the location of the public latrines.
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Table 2
Dumping variables summary statistics.
Mean
(Std Dev)
Do most people bathe in the river? 0.791
(0.407)
Do most people drink from the river? 0.343
(0.475)
Do most people primarily dump trash in the river? 0.0915
(0.288)
Observations 108,991
The table reports the proportion of villages (with standard deviations in
parenthesis) where most people use river for bathing and related sanitary
practices (row 1), drink water from the river (row 2) and dispose off trash
in the river (row 3).
Table 3
Upstream-downstream pairs summary statistics.
Mean Std Dev Min Max
Distance (Km) 60.125 60.779 0.09 1352.352
Population difference 2292.549 3660.449 0 163,161
Same river bathing practice? 0.645 0.478 0 1
Same river trash disposal practice? 0.885 0.319 0 1
In the same province? 0.860 0.347 0 1
Observations 13,123,273
The table reports the relationship between village pairs along the river network. Column 1 presents the
calculated average across all village pairs, with columns 2–4 displaying the standard deviation, min-
imum, and maximum values, respectively. Relationships of interest between village pairs include the
distance between pairs (row 1), the difference in population (row 2), correlated river bathing and trash
dumping behaviors (rows 3 and 4), and shared province (row 5).
Second, it is important to note that our independent variables could be either over- or understated. Including all individuals as
river bathers, where only the majority of individuals engage in river bathing, likely overstates the number of individuals bathing
in rivers. However, excluding any individuals as river bathers in villages where less than a majority of individuals bathe in
rivers understates the true number of individuals bathing in rivers. The concern of unpredictable measurement error in our key
independent variables is addressed in our placebo tests in Table 6. Since we construct our upstream and downstream variables in
the same way, any bias should be present in both, and given that the downstream effects are negligible, this measurement error
is an unlikely source of bias in our results.12 Cautiously, we may interpret our results as the differential impact of upstream
bathing health effects net of downstream bathing health effects. We ﬁnd equivalence in the two interpretations due to the
approximate null effects of downstream river bathing.13
We also obtain population and demographic data from Podes. In addition to village population information, the census also
contains information on whether a river passes through a village, which we use to ground truth the hydrological river network
data. Podes also contains information on a range of socio-economic variables such as dominant source of income in village,
geography of village, quality of governance (e.g. education of village head), access to medical facilities in the village and political
status of the village.
2.4. Construction of drainage basins data and assignment of upstream and downstream villages
We link villages along a hydrological network enabling us to track the impact of upstream river bathers on downstream river
users. Indonesia contains seven major islands with relatively mountainous and high-elevation interiors that create a complex
hydrological network of streams and rivers. The oﬃcial river network for the country fails to identify minor waterways that are
being used by villages for bathing, drinking and trash disposal. As such, conducting a classic hydrological network analysis poses
the risk of failing to assign villages located along minor rivers to the river network, which may understate upstream pollutant
runoff (Fig. 2).
12 Another concern may be turnover in village heads signiﬁcantly altering the responses in Podes. Podes does not report turnover in village heads so it is not
possible to include village head ﬁxed effects. However, in order for this concern to undermine our identiﬁcation strategy, village head turnover would have to
be correlated with the changes in upstream behaviors, which seems unlikely.
13 Another way to characterize our key independent variable described in equation (A.5) is as a scalar multiple of the population weighted average of the
number of villages where a plurality of households engage in polluting behavior, with zero weight being assigned to villages where the dominant location of
bathing is not in the river.
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Table 4
Impact of upstream bathing on downstream diarrheal incidence.
Was there an outbreak of diarrhea? (1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Full Sample Drink from River Not Drink from River
Panel A: Full Panel
Upstream Bathing 0.0222∗∗ 0.0250∗∗ 0.0530∗∗∗ −0.000609
(100,000 individuals) (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0180) (0.0132)
Downstream Bathing 0.00354 0.00294 0.0346 0.00121
(100,000 individuals) (0.00248) (0.00244) (0.0297) (0.00269)
Observations 108,991 106,797 36,819 69,978
R-squared 0.012 0.013 0.023 0.012
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Balanced Panel
Upstream Bathing 0.0327∗∗ 0.0334∗∗ 0.0545∗∗ 0.00106
(100,000 individuals) (0.0134) (0.0139) (0.0228) (0.0165)
Downstream Bathing 0.00445 0.00360 0.111∗ 0.000286
(100,000 individuals) (0.00393) (0.00409) (0.0566) (0.00420)
Observations 48,128 47,054 18,326 28,728
R-squared 0.011 0.012 0.026 0.015
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01 All speciﬁcations include village and province-
year ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the river basin levels. All speciﬁcations include additional controls for total village
population, total upstream population and total downstream population. Columns (2)–(4) include additional controls: dominant
source of income in village, geography of village, quality of governance (education of village head), access to medical facilities in the
village and political status of the village.
Table 5
Impact of upstream bathing weighted by distance.
Was there an outbreak of diarrhea? (1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Full Sample Drink from River Not Drink from River
Upstream Bathing 0.205∗ 0.229∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ −0.0551
(100,000 individuals) (0.111) (0.114) (0.198) (0.141)
Downstream Bathing 0.0318 0.0533 0.681 −0.282
(100,000 individuals) (0.185) (0.189) (0.651) (0.194)
Observations 108,991 106,797 36,819 69,978
R-squared 0.012 0.013 0.023 0.012
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01 All speciﬁcations include village and province-
year ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the river basin levels. All speciﬁcations include additional controls for total village
population, total upstream population and total downstream population. Columns (2)–(4) include additional controls: dominant
source of income in village, geography of village, quality of governance (education of village head), access to medical facilities in the
village and political status of the village.
Instead of tracing the hydrological network directly, we adopt a watershed approach that identiﬁes all upstream-
downstream relationships within each basin using a high resolution digital elevation model (DEM), and then determine on-
river status using survey data. Proprietary approaches to processing such a DEM are less adept to managing canopy interference
- where the presence of tree canopy is mistaken for terrain - which could also render an underestimation of the number of
upstream villages connected topographically to a given downstream village. The problem of canopy interference is compounded
by the approximately 5.8 billion possible village relationships across Indonesia.14
We employ a high-resolution 30m void-ﬁlled DEM alongside village administrative boundaries from Podes. Next, we con-
structed a pour point for each individual village that self-reported location on a river.15 The use of self-reported locations in
this way provides a means to “ground truth” our data to avoid misidentifying on-river (type 1 error) and off-river (type 2 error)
villages.
14 We manage canopy interference and computational processing constraints by developing a clustered implantation of the r.watershed and r.water.outlet
algorithms in GRASS GIS v7.
15 Each pour point identiﬁed the village’s maximum upstream catchment, which is bound by its drainage basin.
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Table 6
Placebo tests.
Was there an outbreak of (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Diarrhea Respiratory Measles Malaria Dengue
Upstream Bathing 0.0222∗∗ 0.00564 −7.24e-05 0.0108 −0.00687
(100,000 individuals) (0.0105) (0.00773) (0.00848) (0.0116) (0.00747)
Downstream Bathing 0.00354 0.000322 0.00318 0.00637∗∗∗ −0.000341
(100,000 individuals) (0.00248) (0.00214) (0.00229) (0.00243) (0.00266)
Observations 108,991 108,991 108,991 108,991 108,991
R-squared 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.015 0.025
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01 All speciﬁcations include village and
province-year ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the river basin levels. The speciﬁcations include additional
controls for total village population, total upstream population and total downstream population. The sample is limited to
villages that self-report proximity to a river.
Fig. 2. Construction of river network data. (Left) low and high order rivers (right) improved assignment.
We map upstream and downstream village relationships independently for each sample year (2000, 2003, 2006 and 2008)
to accommodate the redistricting of administrative units.16 The product of the hydrological analysis is a list of every Indonesian
village and its ordered upstream counterparts across the four sample years (approximately 13.7million upstream observations).
Summary statistics of these upstream-downstream pairs are provided in Table 3.
3. Estimation and identiﬁcation strategy
The challenge in identifying the effects of water polluting behavior on human health is ﬁnding exogenous variation in water
pollution that is large enough to capture an economically measurable effect. There are many plausible reasons why exposure to,
and consumption of, impure watermay be determined endogenously. For instance, poorer individuals who have a lower stock of
health may be ﬁnancially or behaviorally constrained from consuming clean water. Instead of correlating local water pollution
with local health outcomes, we focus on the diarrheal incidence in a given village due to individuals who are geographically
separated but whose (unregulated or unenforced) polluting behavior may affect downstream villages through river networks.
Relying on the identifying assumption that within-province year-to-year changes in upstream polluting behavior are exogenous
to downstream diarrheal incidence, we estimate a linear probability model:
I(DiarrhealOutbreak = 1)vpt = 𝛽1Upstreamvpt + 𝛽2Downstreamvpt + X′vpt𝛿 + 𝛾v + 𝜂pt + 𝜖vpt (2)
16 Three sets of veriﬁcations were conducted. First, the GIS open source algorithmswere compared against the ESRI algorithms. Second, the ﬂow accumulations
were consistent with the oﬃcial Indonesian River Network. Third, the construction of drainage basins was veriﬁed by ensuring the oﬃcial rivers network ﬂowed
properly through each basin ensuring that the constructed basins were logically sound.
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I(·) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the village v in province p at time t had an outbreak of diarrheal disease, and equal to
0 otherwise. Upstreamvpt is the number of people upstream of village v that are engaging in river bathing in province p at time
t. Similarly, Downstreamvpt is the number of people downstream of village v that are engaging in bathing and other hygienic
activities in the river. Appendix A.2 provides further discussion of the year-to-year variation in upstream populations and river
bathing practices used to construct Upstreamvpt.
We also include a vector of controls Xvpt to account for the total population upstream, downstream, and within a given
village. 𝛾v denotes the village ﬁxed effects that control for time-invariant heterogeneity across villages and 𝜂pt are the province-
year ﬁxed effects that control for provincial-level shocks across all years. 𝜖vrt is the error term, with standard errors clustered at
the drainage basin to allow for arbitrary serial correlation across villages along the same drainage basin over time.
While focussing on geographically-separated polluting behavior can avert some endogeneity concerns, to the extent that
individuals could geographically sort over time with wealthier individuals ending up in villages with cleaner water, the coef-
ﬁcient on upstream polluting, 𝛽1 would remain biased. Since we use province-year ﬁxed effects and thereby control for all
province-speciﬁc changes over time, we will focus on such geographic sorting within a province over time. To overcome these
concerns, we test the validity of our identifying assumption with a battery of placebo tests. First, upstream pollution could have
an effect on downstream individuals’ polluting behavior, but downstream polluting should not have a direct effect on upstream
individuals’ health. Second, we estimate the effect of polluting behavior on diseases that are not transmitted through ingestion
of contaminated water, such as measles, malaria, respiratory infections, and dengue. If we are estimating a spurious geography-
health correlation instead of the causal effect of upstream bathing on downstream diarrheal incidence, then we should also
see association with these other diseases that are not waterborne. The absence of such effects would support the identifying
assumption. Third, we add a range of time-varying control variables for changing demographic and poverty characteristics. As
detailed in the results section, each of these tests supports our identifying assumption and thereby increases our conﬁdence
that we are estimating the causal effect of polluting behavior on diarrheal incidence.
Following equation (2), we also estimate avoidance behavior. In particular we test whether individuals reduce consumption
of drinking water from the river in response to upstream polluting.
H(DrinkFromRiver)vpt = 𝛽1Upstreamvpt + 𝛽2Downstreamvpt + X′vpt𝛿 + 𝛾v + 𝜂pt + 𝜖vpt (3)
where H(·) is an indicator function equal to 1 if most people in that village drink water from the river.
Two additional econometric issues bear noting. First, there could be potential concerns over the choice of our estimator.
We ﬁnd that our estimates are robust to different choices of estimator. In particular, we use the ﬁxed effects logit estimator
and ﬁnd that our results are qualitatively similar, as reported in Appendix Table A.1. We also ﬁnd that a mere 0.3 percent of our
observations (433 out of 108,991) had predicted values outside the [0,1] range, suggesting that ﬁt is not a concern with the use of
a linear probabilitymodel. Second, we cluster our standard errors at the drainage basin to allow for errors to be correlated across
villages along the same river segment and over time. Given that the pollutants accumulate along a river segment, clustering at
the drainage basin allows for conservative inference on the effects of upstream polluting behavior.
4. Results
4.1. Health effects
We are primarily interested in the effects of in-river bathing and other household sanitary practices on downstream health
outcomes. We estimate the effects of polluting behavior on both upstream and downstream locations simultaneously using
equation (2) and ﬁnd that upstream bathing causes increased diarrheal incidence whereas downstream polluting behavior has
no effect on upstream health outcomes. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that an additional 100,000 individuals upstream using the river for
bathing and related sanitary activities increases diarrhea incidence by 2.52 percentage points or 13.7 percent (Table 4, panel
A, column 1–2). To contextualize, a one sample standard deviation increase in the number of people upstream from a village
(182,940 individuals) using the river for bathing and sanitary activities increases the probability of diarrheal outbreak in that
village by 4.59 percentage points. Using the within-sample average of 18.29 percent diarrheal incidence, this corresponds to
a 25.10 percent effect. The result is stable to the choice of speciﬁcation (Appendix Table A.1). The magnitude of the effect of
upstream bathing on downstream diarrheal incidence is considerably larger when limiting our sample to only those villages
where the primary source of drinking water is the river (column 3) with a negligible effect when limiting our sample to villages
where the primary source of drinking water is from sources other than the river (column 4). Cumulatively yet conservatively,
we estimate that upstream hygienic activities can explain 860 deaths, which is 7.5 percent of all diarrheal deaths in our sample,
suggesting that there is a large human cost to household polluting behavior.17
We ﬁnd no evidence on the impact of diarrheal incidence from downstream river bathing (Table 4, panel A). As any pollutants
from downstream villages cannot travel up the river naturally, the economically small and statistically insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient
associated with downstream bathing behavior lends further credibility to our identiﬁcation strategy. As noted in section 2, to
overcome challenges of potential measurement error in the construction of ourmain independent variable (upstreamhousehold
17 It is important to note that these are equilibrium effects, net of any possible avoidance behavior. The lack of signiﬁcant effect for those villages that do not
drink from the river may in part be an endogenous effect of those villages avoiding particularly polluted sections of the river.
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polluting behavior), we can think of the net effect as the difference between the coeﬃcient on upstream and downstream
polluting behavior, since the measurement error should be similar given the identical method of construction of both variables.
The null effect of downstream polluting behavior suggests that measurement error does not appreciably bias our main result.
Additionally, as noted earlier, our panel data set is unbalanced. To address concerns over selection of different villages over
different time periods, we limit our sample to the balanced panel (Table 4, panel B) and ﬁnd that our results are qualitatively
and quantitatively similar to those from the full sample.
Finally, we address the concern that pollution dissipates over long distances along the river network. In the main speciﬁca-
tion, the Upstreamvt indicator provides equal weight to each individual in a village that partakes in river bathing. However, it is
possible that bathing activity from more distant villages may have little to no impact on disease outcomes if the contaminants
dissipate over the course of the river. Given the method of river network construction discussed in section 2, we can address
this mechanism by weighting individuals in closer villages more than those who are farther away. To do this, we calculate an
alternative upstream (and downstream) measure for bathing behavior as:
Upstreamvt =
∑
nvt
[
populationnt ∗ bathingnt ∗ f (distancent)
]
(4)
where distancent is the distance (in meters) of the centroid of village n from village v. The function f(·) weights the relative
distance of the villages with the property that f′ ≤ 0.
Table 5 presents main regression results using this distance-weighting indicator.18 The results are similar to those in Table 4
in both sign and statistical signiﬁcance. Notably, the distance-weighted results are larger by an order of magnitude, which is
consistent with the fact that bathing populations farther upstream have a dissipated impact on downstream human health.
This magnitude increase is offset by the lower weighting of far upstream populations, and using the distance-weighted esti-
mates predicts approximately 700 deaths over 4 years, which is a similar prediction to the mortality estimate using the main
speciﬁcation.
5. Robustness checks and extensions
In this section, we present additional validation for our identiﬁcation strategy. We report results from (1) falsiﬁcation tests to
test the possibility of a correlation between location on a river stream, subsequent river use and health in general (not speciﬁc to
diarrhea), (2) heterogeneity by geographic and topographic factors, (3) including rainfall and ﬂooding as possible confounding
variables along with causal bounds following Oster (2017), and (4) considering forms of upstream polluting behavior other than
bathing and associated sanitary practices. We conclude this section by providing suggestive evidence of differential avoidance
behavior occurring as a result of visible river pollution (trash dumping) as compared to inconspicuous forms of pollution (river
bathing and sanitation).
5.1. Falsiﬁcation tests
In this section, we provide the results from a battery of falsiﬁcation tests to further validate our identiﬁcation strategy.
Table 6 shows that the effect we ﬁnd is (1) speciﬁc to diarrheal incidence and (2) speciﬁc to upstream polluting behavior. As
shown in the table, we ﬁnd no evidence of an effect on diarrheal (or any other diseases) incidence in a given village in response
to downstream bathing. Not only is the effect of downstream bathing statistically indistinguishable from zero, it is also an order
of magnitude smaller than the effect of upstream polluting. Therefore, we can reasonably rule out concerns over drainage basin
speciﬁc, time-varying factors that are correlated with both polluting behavior and diarrheal outcomes.
Additionally, we follow Garg (2017) and provide falsiﬁcation tests on other diseases (Table 6, columns 2–5). Spurious corre-
lation between downstream health (driven by, for example, demographic or political economy factors) and upstream polluting
behavior should be shared when predicting the impact of upstream pollutants on other disease outbreaks. For instance, if indi-
viduals were geographically sorting over time in response to poor health conditions (but not to upstream bathing), then we
should expect to see a correlation with incidence of at least one of the other diseases. The absence of any noticeable or mean-
ingful effect on any of the other diseases further supports the validity of our identiﬁcation strategy.19
5.2. Topographic and geographic factors
Next we isolate effects based on different geographies to deduce whether (1) the results are consistent with the topography
of villages (ﬂat versus hilly), which would affect the rate of water ﬂow, and (2) there are systematic differences in the effects
of upstream bathing across urban and rural villages in our sample. In Table 7, we provide results breaking down the effect of
upstream bathing by topography (columns 2–3) and by urbanization (columns 4–5). Consistent with our intuition, we ﬁnd that
the bulk of the human health effect is concentrated in ﬂat rather than hilly villages due to the propensity for eutrophication
18 In this speciﬁcation, we use the weighting function f(distance) = 1∕log(distance).
19 We also test for non-linearities in Appendix Table A.2 and ﬁnd no evidence to support a non-linear relationship between exposure to upstream river bathing
and downstream diarrheal incidence.
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Table 7
Results disaggregated by geography.
Was there an outbreak of diarrhea? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Sample Flat Hilly Urban Rural
Upstream Bathing 0.0222∗∗ 0.0248∗ −0.0431 0.0178 0.0203∗
(100,000 individuals) (0.0105) (0.0142) (0.0531) (0.0211) (0.0117)
Downstream Bathing 0.00354 0.00281 −0.000537 0.00257 0.00615∗
(100,000 individuals) (0.00248) (0.00294) (0.00921) (0.00430) (0.00356)
Observations 108,991 54,122 23,124 10,298 98,693
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.029 0.046 0.013
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01 All speciﬁcations include village and
province-year ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the river basin levels. The speciﬁcations include additional controls
for total village population, total upstream population and total downstream population. The sample is limited to villages that
self-report proximity to a river.
Table 8
Impact of upstream bathing controlling for rainfall and ﬂooding.
Was there an outbreak of diarrhea? (1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample
Upstream Bathing 0.0220∗∗ 0.0226∗∗ 0.0212∗∗
(100,000 individuals) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0103)
Downstream Bathing 0.00366 0.00348 0.00341
(100,000 individuals) (0.00248) (0.00247) (0.00247)
Observations 108,991 108,991 108,991
R-squared 0.012 0.014 0.014
Annual Rainfall Desa Only Desa Only Desa & Upstream
Deviation from Average Desa Only Desa Only Desa & Upstream
Flooding No Yes Yes
Village FE Yes Yes Yes
Province-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Delta 1.003 1.273 1.340
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01 All speciﬁcations
include village and province-year ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the river basin levels.
All speciﬁcations include additional controls for total village population, total upstream population and
total downstream population. Column (1) includes controls for the annual rainfall in a given village,
as well as the deviation in daily rainfall for the 5-year average. Column (2) uses the same controls as
Column (1), in addition to a variable that measures the number of ﬂoods that the village experienced
in the previous 3 years. Column (3) uses the same controls as Column (2), and includes the average
annual rainfall and deviation from 5-year average for all of the upstream villages. The last row presents
estimates of the coeﬃcient of proportionality following (Oster, 2017), assuming values of 𝛽 = 0 and
Rmax = 0.3.
in stagnant water (Jiménez, 2006). By contrast, we ﬁnd no evidence of differential impacts in rural versus urban locations,
suggesting that avoidance behavior may not be region-speciﬁc.
5.3. Rainfall and ﬂooding
Another channel that may affect the estimation results is the presence of heavy rainfall events. Our results are robust to
controlling for the frequency and level of rainfall in villages in a given year to control for both the direct physical channel, as
well as the indirect income channel that may affect health outcomes in a village. We address these concerns by constructing
village-level rainfall measures using data from NOAA’s Climate Prediction Center (CPC).20 The CPC’s Merged Analysis pentad
dataset provides globally gridded, 5-day precipitation estimates (in mm/day) from Jan 1979 to May 2013. We calculate each
village’s spatially-weighted average of rainfall in 5-day intervals between 1995 and 2012. With these estimates, we create
various rainfall measures that are used as additional control variables for the main estimating equation. The results of these
regressions are presented in Table 8 and are similar in both magnitude and signiﬁcance to the coeﬃcient estimate of Table 4
- indicating that neither rainfall nor ﬂooding appears to play as signiﬁcant a role in village health outcomes as the presence of
upstream hygienic activities. Furthermore, we follow (Oster, 2017) and estimate that, conditional on the included ﬁxed effects,
the selection on unobservable variables would have to be 1.34 times the selection on observable variables for our estimate to be
20 Data was downloaded from the IRI Data library of Columbia University’s International Research Institute for Climate and Society, Earth Institute: http://iridl.
ldeo.columbia.edu/.
T. Garg et al. / Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 92 (2018) 35–5346
Table 9
Measures of river access.
Was there an outbreak of diarrhea? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample
Upstream Trash 0.00449 −0.000271
(100,000 individuals) (0.0123) (0.0121)
Upstream Irrigation −0.0218 −0.0193 −0.0288∗
(100,000 individuals) (0.0140) (0.0146) (0.0149)
Upstream Industry −0.000799 0.0108 0.00638
(100,000 individuals) (0.00102) (0.0141) (0.0141)
Upstream Transportation −0.000522 −0.00784∗ −0.00833∗
(100,000 individuals) (0.000564) (0.00454) (0.00451)
Upstream Other Activities −0.000214 0.000836 0.00238
(100,000 individuals) (0.000339) (0.00423) (0.00418)
Upstream Bathing 0.0307∗∗∗
(100,000 individuals) (0.00786)
Observations 106,797 106,797 106,797 106,797 106,797 106,797 106,797
R-squared 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01 All speciﬁcations include village and province-year ﬁxed effects. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the river basin levels. All speciﬁcations include additional controls for total village population, total upstream population, total
downstream population, dominant source of income in village, geography of village, quality of governance (education of village head), access to medical
facilities in the village and political status of the village.
biased away from zero.
5.4. Proxy for river access
While our identiﬁcation strategy (complemented with the falsiﬁcation tests) allows us to be reasonably conﬁdent we are
likely estimating the causal effect of upstream polluting activity on downstream health, it is possible that our river bathing and
sanitation variable is merely a proxy for upstream river access. Villages in which the river is more accessible (e.g. not ﬂowing
through a deep gorge) may promote increased river use for bathing and sanitation as well as for other purposes. While the
falsiﬁcation tests presented in Table 6 allow us to reasonably exclude a non-waterborne transmission mechanism, they do not
rule out other pollution sources besides bathing, such as agricultural runoff that may be driving the main result.
We address this by using a question from Podes regarding the village’s river use. The question provides a binary indicator
for whether the river is used for a host of economic activities: trash disposal, agriculture, industry, transportation, and “other”
miscellaneous activities. We replicate the calculation from equation (2) using these respective indicators in place of the river
bathing indicator.
Table 9 presents the results of using these accessibility-to-river population indicators as a predictor of diarrheal outbreak.
None of these activities alone (columns 1–5) have economically meaningful and statistically signiﬁcant predictive power on
the probability of a downstream diarrheal outbreak. When considering the set of upstream polluting activities on which we
have information (column 6), we see a strong effect of upstream bathing and sanitary activities whereas the absence of any
measurable relationship between upstream river access and downstream human health outcomes remains. As column 6 should
display any of the predictive power related to river access besides river bathing, we can be cautiously optimistic that the effect
we ﬁnd in Table 4 is being driven by upstream river pollution related to bathing activities and not generically river access.
5.5. Do individuals protect themselves from river pollution?
Since upstream use of rivers for bathing and sanitation results in large downstream health externalities, to what extent do
individuals seek to protect themselves from such river pollution? We use a question in Podes on the primary source of drinking
water to understand the extent to which the use of the river for drinking water changes in response to upstream polluting
behavior. In Table 10 we consider avoidance behavior in response to upstream use of rivers for bathing and sanitation versus
trash disposal. In Panel A, we show that upstream bathing and sanitation results in no measurable change in drinking raw
water from the river (column 1), whereas upstream trash disposal signiﬁcantly (p-value=0.06 for a two-sided test) reduces the
number of villages consuming raw water from the river (column 2).21 These results hold when we include the two variables
together. In contrast, in Panel B, we show that while upstream bathing and sanitation has a strong effect on diarrheal incidence,
no such effect is observed from upstream trash disposal (column1), evenwhen limiting our sample to villageswhere the primary
source of drinking water is the river (column 2).
21 We estimate avoidance behavior on the full set of potential upstream polluting variables considered in Table 9 and report these in Table A.3.
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Table 10
Avoidance behavior.
Panel A: Avoidance Behavior
Is the river used for raw drinking? (1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample
Upstream Bathing 0.0155 0.0165
(100,000 individuals) (0.0115) (0.0114)
Upstream Trash −0.0190∗ −0.0195∗
(100,000 individuals) (0.0105) (0.0104)
Observations 106,797 106,797 106,797
R-squared 0.017 0.017 0.018
Village FE Yes Yes Yes
Province-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Main Result
Was there an outbreak of diarrhea? (1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Drink from River Not Drink from River
Upstream Bathing 0.0235∗∗ 0.0528∗∗∗ −0.00155
(100,000 individuals) (0.0106) (0.0177) (0.0133)
Upstream Trash 0.00352 −0.0126 −0.00347
(100,000 individuals) (0.0122) (0.0168) (0.0141)
Observations 106,797 36,819 69,978
R-squared 0.013 0.023 0.012
Village FE Yes Yes Yes
Province-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01 All speciﬁcations include
village and province-year ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the river basin levels. All speciﬁcations
include additional controls for total village population, total upstream population and total downstream popula-
tion. Panel A uses a binary variable “domost people drink rawwater from the river” as the explanatory variable.
Columns (1) and (2) include upstream bathing and trash separately whereas Column (3) includes both variables
together. In Panel B, we report results on the effect of upstream bathing and trash on diarrheal incidence. Col-
umn (1) estimates this relationship over the full sample, whereas we limit the sample to those villageswhere the
river is the primary source of drinking water (Column 2) and where the river is not the primary source of drink-
ing water (Column 3). An extended version of Panel A containing other potential forms of upstream pollution is
reported as Appendix Table A.3.
While we cannot explicitly test the motivations behind this gap in avoidance behavior, we hypothesize two plausible expla-
nations. First, trash disposal in the river may pose a higher health risk than other river uses, and as such individuals are more
active in avoiding the risk arising from the former. However, the primary effect of trash (particularly plastics) on human health
is through endocrine disruptions, which may not manifest as noticeably as diarrheal episodes caused by organic water contam-
ination (Thompson et al., 2009). Second, trash disposal could result in pollutants that are visible to the naked eye, in contrast
to impurities generated from bathing that are less or not visible to individuals. This explanation is consistent with our results
in Table 10 that individuals stop drinking water from the river in response to upstream trash polluting but not in response
to upstream bathing. However, data limitations prevent us from identifying the exact mechanism behind the differences in
avoidance behavior and we leave that as an open question for future research.22
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we construct and employ a novel data set on Indonesia’s drainage basins to provide the ﬁrst causal evidence
that household-level polluting behavior and in particular upstream in-river bathing and associated sanitary activities generates
large downstream health externalities. Our results are particularly relevant to policymakers for several reasons. First, we ﬁnd
that upstream river hygienic activities can explain asmany as 860 deaths over four years representing 7.5 percent of all diarrheal
deaths in our sample. This represents a large human cost from a source of river pollution that remains under-explored in the
22 There is also suggestive evidence that villages are discretionary in their bathing activity as it relates to local agricultural activities - i.e., areas using the river
for agriculture are less likely to bathe in the same waters, - which is conﬁrmed by (i) a negative in-sample correlation coeﬃcient of −0.13 between the within
village river bathing and irrigation variables from Podes and (ii) an increase in the marginal effect of upstream river bathing on downstream diarrheal incidence
in Table 9 when these upstream indicators are included together. Moreover, the Table 9 coeﬃcient on “Upstream irrigation”, which serves as our single best
proxy for upstream agricultural activity, is negative - further suggesting that villages are differentially avoiding use of the river for bathing and sanitation when
it is simultaneously used for irrigation.
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literature.23
We ﬁnd suggestive evidence for differential avoidance behavior across different forms of upstream polluting behaviors. One
of many candidate explanations is that individuals avoid visible but not invisible pollutants by seeking alternative sources of
fresh water. If this is the case, considerable health savings may be obtained by investing in the prevention of “silent killers”
against which households are less prone to taking defensive actions. Instead of large scale government programs aimed at river
basin cleanup, which may be ﬁnancially or technologically infeasible, policymakers may focus on preventing those polluting
activities that are diﬃcult for downstream households to detect. Future research should examine behavioral explanations for
differences in avoidance behavior across pollutants.
A. Appendix
A.1. Validation of outbreak variable
Given that our outbreak variable is binary we provide below a histogram of the distribution of the number of deaths condi-
tional on an outbreak. The bunching around zero suggests that the outbreak variable is sensitive enough to pick up even cases
when disease occurs, but no deaths do.
Fig. A.1. Distribution of number of deaths conditional on a diarrhea outbreak.
A.2. Variation in upstream bathing behavior
As the identiﬁcation strategy relies on the changes in upstream river bathing populations, in this section we investigate the
source of this variation across rounds of Podes. The key independent variable - the number of individuals engaging in upstream
river bathing - is deﬁned for a given year t, village v, with nvt villages upstream along the river that passes through village v as,
Upstreamvt =
∑
nvt
[
populationnt ∗ bathingnt
]
(A.5)
where populationnt is the population of the n
th
t
upstream village and bathingnt is a binary variable, which is equal to 1 if the
majority of households in the village bathe in the river in year t, and 0 otherwise.
Given that year-to-year variations in Upstreamvt can come from changes in upstream populations, the changes in river
bathing behavior of these upstream villages, or both, we provide below a histogram of the variation in these variables across the
four rounds of Podes.
23 Back of the envelope calculations suggest that policy targeting based on geographic location of the source of pollution can result in substantial health savings
(see Appendix A.6). In particular, a 1 percent decrease in in-river bathers in the most upstream decile reduces fatalities by 2.54 percent. By contrast, a 1 percent
decrease in in-river bathers in the most downstream decile reduces fatalities by only 1.62 percent. Policy options tailored to local geographic considerations are
particularly relevant in Indonesia and other developing countries where limited resources for enforcement require precision targeting of point-source pollution.
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Fig. A.2.Within village variation in river bathing and upstream population across years.
The within-village median change in total upstream population (i.e., regardless of river bathing practices) across the four
rounds of Podes is 3.26%, with the histogram closely resembling the normal distribution. As population growth is not monoton-
ically increasing or decreasing - 35% of population changes are losses - it is unlikely that these population changes are the sole
driver of the observed effects in Table 2.
Panel (b) shows the year-to-year changes in river bathing practices for a given village. While nearly three quarters of villages
either always or never use the river for bathing, there is an appreciable amount of “switching” within villages. Of the 25% of
instances where villages switch river bathing practices, nearly half were villages that transitioned to non-river bathing behavior
across the study period.
As both upstream population and river bathing practices display signiﬁcant shares of positive and negative variation across
Podes rounds, our identifying variation is coming from both changes in population and changes in use of rivers for bathing and
sanitation.
A.3. Robustness to choice of estimator
In this section, we validate the choice of estimator. Column 1 presents the coeﬃcients of a linear probability model (LPM)
in predicting the diarrheal epidemic in a village in a given year. Using an LPM generates only 0.3% of predicted values that are
outside the [0,1] range. Column 2 performs a similar estimation using a panel logit model instead of an LPM. The results of the
estimation are qualitatively similar to the LPM regression, and maintains both the sign and level of signiﬁcance for the bathing
estimator.
Table A.1
Robustness to choice of estimator.
(1) (2)
LPM Logit
Upstream Bathing 0.0222∗∗ 0.172∗∗
(100,000 individuals) (0.0105) (0.0710)
Downstream Bathing 0.00354 0.0348
(100,000 individuals) (0.00248) (0.0299)
Observations 108,991 41,332
R-squared 0.012 0.026
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗∗∗p < 0.01 All speciﬁcations include village and province-year ﬁxed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the river basin levels. Both
speciﬁcations include additional controls for total village population,
total upstream population and total downstream population. Column (1)
presents estimation using an OLS linear probability model, with approxi-
mately 0.3% of predicted values lying outside the [0,1] range. Column (2)
presents the results of the ﬁxed effects logit model. R-squared presented
in the table is the psuedo-R2 calculated by the logit estimation. The num-
ber of observations using the FE Logit model is smaller than Column (1)
due to all-positive or all-negative outcomes for village across all 4 years
of the panel being dropped. The ﬁxed effect logit model does not allow
for the computation of the marginal effect at the mean value for the vari-
ables of interest - for a more detailed discussion, see Kitazawa (2012).
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A.4. Testing for non-linearities
In this section, we test for whether there exists a non-linear relationship between upstream bathing behavior and diarrheal
incidence in downstream villages. Column 1 presents themain result of the paper using the OLS estimator, and is identical to the
corresponding column in Table 4. Column 2 applies a quadratic ﬁt to the bathing estimator, and ﬁnds no signiﬁcant relationship
between diarrheal outbreak and the square of upstream bathing populations. The third column runs an OLS regression using the
log of upstream bathing values. This monotonic transform of the explanatory variable is qualitatively similar to the main spec-
iﬁcation, and although the estimator is an order of magnitude smaller, it still estimates a positive and signiﬁcant relationship.
Thus we ﬁnd no evidence to support a non-linear relationship between exposure to upstream river bathing and downstream
diarrheal incidence.
Table A.2
Testing for non-linearities.
(1) (2) (3)
Linear Quadratic Logarithmic
Upstream Bathing 0.0222∗∗ 0.0227
(100,000 individuals) (0.0105) (0.0139)
Square [Upstream Bathing] −8.20e-06
(100,000 individuals) (0.000365)
Log[Upstream Bathing] 0.00492∗∗∗
(100,000 individuals) (0.00114)
Observations 108,991 108,991 108,991
R-squared 0.012 0.012 0.013
Village FE Yes Yes Yes
Province-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01 All spec-
iﬁcations include village and province-year ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
river basin levels. All speciﬁcations include additional controls for total village population, total
upstream population and total downstream population. The sample is limited to villages that
self-report proximity to a river. The mean number of upstream bathing households is 54,840.
A.5. Avoidance behavior and river access
In this section, we expand on Table 10 to include other forms of potential upstream polluting behaviors.
Table A.3
Avoidance behavior and river access.
Is the River Used for Raw Drinking? (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample
Upstream Bathing 0.0165 0.0137 0.0136 0.0129 0.0136 0.0123
(100,000 individuals) (0.0114) (0.0121) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0121)
Upstream Trash −0.0195∗ −0.0206∗
(100,000 individuals) (0.0104) (0.0107)
Upstream Irrigation 0.00628 −1.17e-05
(100,000 individuals) (0.0119) (0.0118)
Upstream Industry 7.95e-06 −0.00741
(100,000 individuals) (0.00110) (0.0132)
Upstream Transportation 9.78e-05 0.00161
(100,000 individuals) (0.000622) (0.00406)
Upstream Other Activities 1.65e-05 0.00187
(100,000 individuals) (0.000367) (0.00373)
Observations 106,797 106,797 106,797 106,797 106,797 106,797
R-squared 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01 All speciﬁcations include village and province-year ﬁxed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the river basin levels. All speciﬁcations include additional controls for total village population, total upstream population,
total downstream population, dominant source of income in village, geography of village, quality of governance (education of village head), access to
medical facilities in the village and political status of the village. Columns (1)–(5) report the resultswith individual sources of upstream polluting behavior
whereas Column (6) reports results from the joint estimation.
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A.6. Policy simulation
The impact of upstream bathing on downstream health suggests that policy responses to river pollution should be targeted
with consideration to geography. Therefore, we conduct a set of policy simulations by imposing increasingly stringent morato-
riums on river bathing (Table A.4).24
We show that the geography of targeting is essential to cost-effective policy. We categorize all sample villages into deciles
based on total downriver population. Villages located near a river’s headwaters with a large downstream population are grouped
into the ﬁrst decile while most downstream villages are grouped into the tenth decile (Table A.4). Targeting upstream villages
generates the largest beneﬁt - targeting the most upstream villages is an order of magnitude more effective than targeting
downstream villages. Speciﬁcally, avoiding a single diarrheal death requires preventing 971,000 individuals in the most down-
stream decile from bathing but only 82,000 individuals in the most upstream decile. Our ﬁndings are therefore consistent with
recent work on the political economy of water pollution (Lipscomb and Mobarak, 2017).
The baseline case, which most closely resembles the current state of affairs in Indonesia, has no regulation on river bathing
activity. Population deciles with the largest downstream populations are then targeted incrementally until a complete morato-
rium on river bathing is achieved. Column 2 in Table A.4 shows the number of individuals bathing in the river in each decile.25 In
our two extreme cases, the absence of regulation on river bathing allows the 860 deaths attributable to river bathing to persist
while a strict moratorium on river bathing prevents all of these deaths (Table A.4, column 3).
However, avoided deaths on decile-level moratoriums is not a comparable measure across the different deciles that have
varying number of bathers. We generate twomeasures that allow us to compare moratoriums on different deciles - average and
marginal number of individuals who must stop bathing to avoid a single instance of diarrheal mortality (Table A.4, columns 3
and 4 respectively). These cost calculations are akin to average and marginal costs of the policies per unit of beneﬁt (Fig. A.3).
Columns (3) and (4) show that a policymaker interested in reducing diarrheal deaths would have to inconvenience (or compen-
sate) the fewest number of individuals per avoided death in the most upstream decile - 82,000 individuals who bathe in a river,
versus 971,000 individuals in the most downstream decile. Conversely, in columns 5 and 6 (Table A.4), we develop an elastic-
ity measure that shows reductions in mortality from a 1 percent reduction in decile-speciﬁc river bathers (Fig. A.4). Reducing
top-decile bathers by 1 percent reduces marginal downstream diarrhea-related mortalities by 2.54 percent but reducing the
lowest-decile bathers by 1 percent reduces marginal mortalities by only 1.61 percent.
Table A.4
Policy simulations.
Targeting Rule (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bathing individuals
impacted (millions)
Predicted
mortality
reduction
Average: Bathers
removed per
avoided death
(thousands)
Marginal: Bathers
removed per
avoided death
(thousands)
Average: % Change
in mortality per 1%
decrease in bathers
Marginal: % Change
in mortality per 1%
decrease in bathers
No regulation of river bathing 0 0 – – – –
Top decile only 2.4 29 82 82 2.54 2.54
Deciles (1–2) 5.5 62 88 93 2.37 2.28
Deciles (1–3) 11.5 123 93 99 2.23 2.21
Deciles (1–4) 21.8 226 97 101 2.16 2.27
Deciles (1–5) 37.8 356 106 122 1.97 2.03
Deciles (1–6) 55.8 493 113 132 1.84 2.13
Deciles (1–7) 77.6 620 125 171 1.67 1.97
Deciles (1–8) 103.7 731 142 236 1.47 1.80
Deciles (1–9) 133.6 813 164 364 1.27 1.61
Complete Moratorium on river bathing 179.5 860 209 975 1.00 1.00
Simulations include 108,990 village-year observations (2000, 2003, 2006 and 2008). Each 100,000 upstream bathing individuals increase epidemic rates
by 0.025 while each epidemic yields 0.58 deaths, which is the sample average for all on-river villages across all years (excluding Java). The targeting
rule deciles are based on total downstream population. For example, the top decile includes only those top 10% of villages with the largest downstream
populations. Column one shows that increasingly stringent moratoriums on river bathing increase the number of bathing individuals affected, which
corresponds directly with a reduction in predicted mortality displayed in column 2. Columns 3 and 4 capture the number of bathers that must be
removed to prevent a death where column 3 is the average effect across all deciles under the moratorium and column 4 is the marginal effect of the most
downstream moratorium decile. Columns 5 and 6 present estimates of the elasticity of placing a moratorium on river bathing. Column 5 captures the
change in mortality per 1% decrease in bathers, averaged over the deciles under the moratorium. Column 6 presents the effect of the change in mortality
per 1% decrease in bathers for the marginal decile placed under moratorium. Here, elasticities are generally decreasing resembling the impact of targeting
the most upstream and detrimental individuals. However, because the policy rule is based on cumulative downstream population along the river, not the
downstream bathing population, it is possible for the marginal elasticity measure to increase with the addition of a new decile.
24 Simulations are cumulative across all four sample years (2000, 2003, 2006 and 2008) and the exposure variable (upstream bathing population) is updated
by recalculating the sample mean with a moratorium imposed on villages that fall under the targeting rule. Epidemics are predicted using the rate of 0.0252
per 100,000 upstream individuals and deaths are predicted using the sample average of 0.58 diarrhea-related fatalities occurring within a village per diarrhea
outbreak. Elasticity measures are calculated as the percentage change in diarrhea-related deaths divided by the percentage change in bathing individuals for
each policy increment. Note that the marginal elasticities are not forced to be decreasing as they are calculated for incremental adjustments to the policy rather
than as percentage changes from the no-regulation baseline (which would be necessarily decreasing in magnitude).
25 Deciles are constructed based on total population, not bathing-in-river populations.
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Fig. A.3.Marginal and average cost by geographic deciles.
Fig. A.4. Percentage reduction in mortality per 1% decrease in bathers by targeting rule.
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